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the lawyer, understanding the purpose and rationale behind accounting doctrine
is as important as understanding the policy behind rules of law. Professor
Shugerman's book does not itself provide this necessary background. Further-
more, it does not even adequately open for the reader the gateway to account-
ing treatises and periodicals.
In fairness to Professor Shugerman it should be recognized that he has
attempted a difficult job. It is not easy to be brief yet comprehensive and simple
yet analytic. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the often difficult
field of accounting can be effortlessly opened to lawyers who, after all, are not
a breed apart. Perhaps subsequent editions of this work can remedy its defects
while continuing to provide the desired simplicity.
DoNALD ScHAPIRo'"
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN. By Wolfgang Fried-
mann. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1951. Pp. xxiv, 322. $6.75.
TMR. Friedmann, the well-laiown author of Legal Theory, has worked his
recent articles into a panorama of the rapidly changing legal scene. Against
the background of the British and to some extent of the Commonwealth law,
he presents a lucid description of the present status and function of property
and contract, the relations between social insurance and tort, and a sketch
of judicial withdrawal and neutrality in freedom of trade cases. To these
chapters has been added a completely new section, scrutinizing the changed
functions of Anglo-American trusts. On the basis of this analysis the author
enters a plea for a more vigorous assertion of judicial authority in cases con-
cerning professional bodies and private associations. The second and a good
part of the third book provide some systematization of British public law,
concentrating on extension of legal remedies, the relationship between contract
and administrative law, the limits of administrative discretion, and conflicting
methods of statutory interpretation.
In his last and somewhat controversial chapter, the author inquires into
the place of the rule of law in a democratic planned society. The central thesis
of the book is built around the demonstration that the rule of law is perfectly
compatible with the major tenets and operations of such a society. This rule
of law (construed without reference to Dicey's vindictiveness against adminis-
trative law and its exclusive enforcement through the law courts) possesses
a dual function: judicial authority continues to safeguard individual rights:
yet there is equal emphasis on its ability to assure equality of the law for those
engaging in comparable legal transactions. To be sure, the effective extension
of safeguards of individual rights through the abolition of civil and criminal
immunities of the Crown and the current narrowing down of the Acts of
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State exemptions testifies that there exists no a priori incompatibility between
the rule of law and the major tenets of a planned democratic society. However,
the author rightly notes an important change: to the extent to which enforce-
ment of such guarantees of individual rights is coming to rest with adminis-
trative tribunals, the traditional presumption favoring maintenance of private
rights, an historical rather than a necessary part of the rule of law, no longer
possesses full force. It is whittled down to something akin to the doctrine of
the least injustice to the private rights of the few consonant with the carrying
out of the social objective of the specific legislation.' Equally, the state of mobili-
zation, characterized by the author as a permanent feature of Western society,
inevitably reinforces the authority of the administrative decision; the likelihood
of reversal by the courts has been lessened by the apparent necessity to uphold
constituted authority. Hence the author's optimism which sees in Livcrsidgc
v. Anderson2 only an exception rather than a pattern may be a bit over-
sanguine. It would probably have been more justifiable to argue that the range
of administrative decisions falling under this category is not broad enough to
negate the very principle of the rule of law.
So far we have mainly been concerned with actions in which the state and
an individual figured as the parties to the contest. As pertinent, if not more,
for the meaning of the rule of law in a planned democratic society is the rapidly
diminishing scope of all other types of actions in which courts effectively inter-
fere. The author himself strongly insists on the transfer of decision-making
authority to parliamentary, i.e., political, authorities in the field of planning. He
is a little less certain, however, where to put cofitrol over contending, organized
groups, and he has harbored some illusions about courts' possible intervention
in solving intragroup conflicts in professional bodies. Yet actually from the six
major types of disputes (intra and intergroup controversies, disputes between
outsiders and the group, between the state and the group, the state and isolated
individuals, and among individuals without group protection), court deter-
mination is still conclusive in only the last two categories. As to the other
groups, decision-making power either rests with political authorities inside
the group itself or presently lacks any definite localization.
If the author had more clearly realized that both the limits and achieve-
ments of the rule of law rest on the presence of a body of general rules rather
than on the ability authoritatively to improvise solutions for unchartered
situatidns, he would also have perceived that the absence of such rules thwarts
realization of the equality principle. The necessary distinctions which Parlia-
ment is making in allocating resources, as any other fundamental decisions of
1. Shawcross, The State and the Law, 11 MOn. L. REv. 1 (1948).
2. [1941] 3 All E.R. 338 (P.C. 1941) (action against Home Secretary for false im-
prisonment under emergency regulation 18B denied by majority of Privy Council; "reason-
able belief" of Home Secretary construed as meaning subjective belief in reasonable cause




an emerging societal order, may create the preconditions for a future system of
equality but they hardly apply a rule of equality to existing conditions. And
as to those areas, immense in United States society but considerable enough
in Britain, where at present neither the writ of Parliament nor of the courts
is singularly effective, equality of treatment-the author's inherent element of
the rule of law-has more often than not come to rest with the group's own
and rather tenuous estimates of the dictates of justice.
To be sure, in the author's comparison between the hazards of economic
competition and the hazards inherent in a contract of the planned society,
unilaterally terminated by its government partner, the rule of law emerges
stronger in the new society. It does so because a benign government of demo-
cratic planners grants the individual some legally enforceable indemnity, refused
to the victim who succumbed to the laws of competition. Yet the author's com-
parison is lopsided: capitalist society claims greater rationality and predict-
ability for its total societal results rather than a more perfect justice for the
individual.
What, then, is the meaning of the rule of law in a democratic society in which
a substantial amount of social planning has been accepted by the majority of
the community? The author himself betrays a certain amount of doubt in this
respect. This is shown by his conclusion "that it would be unwise to expect too
much from the law." In reality, no uniform answer is possible, at least at this
stage. Traditional protection continues in cases with conflicting individual
claims. Extension of the rule of law to the ever expanding field of state-in-
dividual relations-though with some reservations-protects the individual
effectively in situations of manifest social inequality; at the same time it throws
the workings of the administrative apparatus open to outside and thus reason-
ably impartial examination. By its very existence, this scrutiny, even if neces-
sarily sketchy, diffuse, and haphazard, imposes definite restraints on the ad-
ministrative bureaucracy. The effectiveness of the rule of law diminishes to
the extent to which it is made to cover intragroup, intergroup, and state-group
relations. It has always proven difficult to subject the sovereign effectively
to the law. And in the democratic society of the British, and even more so in
the United States, the more important social groupings come closest to the
traditional role of the sovereign. From their vantage point these groups are
able to resist successfully the creation of new general rules, the existence of
which would be the major guarantee that the groups would be effectively
brought under the rule of law.3
In concentrating on the formulations of the author's last chapter, rather than
commenting more exhaustively on the timely surveys and analyses of contem-
porary problems in the remainder of the book, this reviewer feels guilty of
3. It is for these very reasons that the suggestion of Clyde NV. Summers, to pattern
legal rules for dealing with the internal structure of unions after those developed to protect
personal freedom, is bound to meet considerable skepticism. Summers, Legal Linmitatiors
o;; Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L REv. 1049, 1101 (1952).
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having done less than justice to this provocative contribution to present legal
literature. It is a work which serves admirably to focus attention on both pos-
sibilities and limits of the judicial process in our society.
OTTO KIRCHHIEIMERt
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLIcy DEVELOPMENT: A CASE Boo. Edited
by Harold Stein. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1952. Pp. xlv,
860. $5.00.
THE first American textbooks on public administration were published only
a generation ago. Yet for well over half of this period there have been sharp
questionings among students of the subject over how what is knowable about
public administration can best be discovered, be recorded, be communicated
to oncoming groups of students and be brought into the consciousness of
officials charged with the solution of administrative problems.
The most recent answer to these questionings is the case approach fostered
by the Committee on Public Administration Cases from 1948-51 and, beginning
in 1952, by the Inter-University Case Program. Dr. Harold Stein, staff
director of these organizations, has brought together twenty-six cases pre-
pared by twenty-one authors, and has prefaced them with a valuable intro-
duction on the purposes and uses of public administration cases.
To understand the nature of a public administration case as conceived by
Dr. Stein and his associates, it is well to dismiss superficial analogies to the
case presented in the traditional law school casebook. It would be difficult
indeed to brief from a public administration case the facts, the question, the
decision, and the rationalization of the decision. Nor are there "leading cases"
in public administration that serve as authoritative precedents for lower-level
or subsequent administrators. Whatever the case may be in law, it appears
infinitely more complex in administration. The published case in public adminis-
tration finds a legal analogy only in what a discerning and thoughtful law
teacher may achieve in his classroom by patiently tracing the evolution of the
case from its inception and by exploring the many factors-some irrational-
that explain, without necessarily justifying, the court's decision.
The public administration case, it is true, usually has an administrative
decision or a succession of decisions as its subject. The task of the case-writer,
however, is to uncover the realistic factors of individual motivations, political
considerations, interest group pressures, breakdowns of procedures, guildism
of "experts," bureaucratic concern with status and self-preservation, and per-
sonal congenialities and antagonisms as they help to explain the decision, its
timing, and its results. A case, however, does not neatly order these con-
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